Fire
API 521 estimates the heat absorbed by the wetted wall of a vessel in a pool fire as
Q = 43,200 F Aw0.82 W, with adequate drainage and prompt firefighting(19)
Q = 70,900 F Aw0.82 W, without them(20)
Aw is the wetted area in m², counted only up to 7.6 m (25 ft) above grade or the fire source; F is the environment factor, 1.0 for a bare vessel.1640
The relief rate is the heat input divided by the latent heat at relieving conditions, W = Q/λ. Near the critical point, where the latent heat is small, API 521 suggests a minimum of 115 kJ/kg as an approximation.40 The gas-filled upper part of a vessel has no liquid to cool it; its wall can lose strength in a fire before the relief valve lifts, which is why depressuring systems exist alongside relief valves.
Gas blowby
If an upstream separator loses its liquid level and its level control valve is open, gas at upstream pressure flows through a valve sized for liquid into a downstream vessel. When the upstream pressure exceeds the downstream vessel’s MAWP, this is often the largest relief case on the downstream drum. API 521 does not allow credit for a favourable control response, so the valve is assumed to stay where the failure left it, and the bypass valve may have to be assumed open as well.3141 The gas flow through the valve follows the control-valve sizing equation of IEC 60534-2-1:21
W = N6 Cv Y √(x p1 ρ1), Y = 1 − x/(3 Fγ xT), x ≤ Fγ xT, Fγ = k/1.40(21)
W in kg/h with N6 = 27.3 for p1 in bar absolute and ρ1 in kg/m³; x = Δp/p1; xT is the valve’s pressure-differential ratio factor. When x reaches FγxT the flow is choked and Y = 2/3.
The remedies are to size the downstream relief valve for the blowby flow, to limit the valve trim or add a restriction orifice so the blowby flow is smaller without affecting normal liquid flow, or to provide an independent low-low level trip, which some companies accept as a high-integrity protection system in place of relief capacity.41
Liquid carryover
Liquid reaching a compressor, a turbine fuel system or a flare can destroy equipment or start a fire. The defences are a conservative K for the service, an inlet device matched to the inlet momentum, a mist eliminator that works across the whole flow range, and an independent high-high level trip with enough surge volume between LAH and LAHH for the trip to act before liquid reaches the inlet nozzle.
Other hazards
- Low temperature. Depressuring a vessel, or flashing liquid across its drain valve, can chill steel below its MDMT. Check auto-refrigeration cases and choose impact-tested steel where needed.
- Hydrates and ice in drains, level bridles and instrument connections: heat tracing, insulation, methanol or glycol injection, and drains that can be cleared safely.
- Sour service. H₂S is toxic and causes sulfide stress cracking: select materials to NACE MR0175/ISO 15156. Iron sulfide deposits can be pyrophoric when a vessel is opened, so keep them wet and purge with nitrogen.
- Erosion from sand at the inlet nozzle and the opposite wall: wear plates, inlet devices, and velocities below the erosional limit.
- Foaming that carries liquid into the gas outlet: a lower K, antifoam, or a cyclonic inlet.
- Draining to atmosphere. Never drain a pressurized separator to an open drain through a single valve; liquid flashes, the valve can freeze open, and gas follows the liquid.
- Vessel entry. Separators are confined spaces with residual hydrocarbons, H₂S and nitrogen. Isolation, purging, gas testing and an entry permit come before anyone goes through the manway.
Questions a HAZOP will ask
- What is the highest pressure any upstream source can impose, and can the vessel see it?
- What is the blowby flow if the upstream level valve and its bypass fail open?
- How long between LAH and LAHH, and between LAHH and the inlet nozzle, at the maximum liquid rate?
- Are the trip transmitters independent of the control transmitter, and tested?
- What is the coldest the steel can get during depressuring?
- Where does the liquid go when the drain is opened, and what does it do when it flashes?